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On 26 May 1932, the House of Lords decided a case that has 
been defined not only as "revolutionary"l and "[the] single most 
important decision in the history of the law of torts'? but even 
as the "most important decision in all the common law". 3 Of 
course, one refers to the so called "Snail Case"· or "Snail in the 
Ginger Beer Case",11 i.e., to Donoghue v. Stevenson6 which has 
not only influenced English7 product liability law but (above all) 
the English law of torts.8 
* Edited by Jessica B. Rudin. 
** Visiting Professor of Comparative Law at Golden Gate University School of Law, 
Dr. iur (Bologna), LL.M. (Augsburg). 
1. 173 LAW TIMES 411 (1932). 
2. A. M. Linden, The Good Neighbour on Trial: A Fountain of Sparkling Wisdom, 
17 U.B.C. L.REV. 67 (1983). 
3. Joseph C. Smith & Peter Burns, The Good Neighbour on Trial: Good Neighbours 
Make Bad Law, 17 U.C.B. L.REV. 93 (1983). See also, Alan Rodger, Mrs. Donoghue and 
Alfenus Varus. 41 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 1. at 2 (1988), where the author states that 
"[Donoghue v. Stevenson] is, after all, probably the most famous case in the whole Com-
monwealth world of the common law." 
4. As for the use of this expression, see, e.g .• Frederick Pollock. The Snail in the 
Bottle, and Thereafter, 49 L.Q.R. 22 (1933). 
5. This expression has been used. for example. by the PAISLEY AND RENPREWSHIRE 
GAZZETTE, 28 May 1932. The decision at issue is known in a few different ways. See, e.g., 
The Daily Express. 27 May 1932. which called it "Food Purity Test Case." Linden, 
supra note 2. 67. at 68, prefers to speak of the "snail in the bottle case." 
6. Donoghue v. Stevenson. (1932) A.C. 562. 
7. However, Donoghue v. Stevenson has not only influenced the English product 
liability law. In 1983, Linden, supra note 2. 67, at 82, referring to Canada, wrote that "to 
this day . . . the rule Lord Atkin laid down still governs the relationships between pro-
ducers and consumers of goods in this country." Of course. Linden. too, was aware that 
"[clertain legislatures [such as Saskatchewan and Brunswickl. however. have responded 
to the calls of the reformers and have enacted strict liability claims." Linden, supra note 
2,67, at 85. 
8. The importance of Donoghue v. Stevenson was recognized not only "among the 
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Despite the celebrity of the decision under review9 , it may 
be useful to summarize what Donoghue v. Stevenson10 actually 
decided, since there has been some confusion on this subjectll • 
In the case under review, the House of Lords had to decide 
whether Mrs. Donoghue12, the pursuer in the Court of Session, 
should be authorized "to go to trial to prove her case"13: Mrs. 
Donoghue suffered a severe shock upon seeing the remains of a 
decomposed snail floating out of a bottle of ginger beer she had 
begun to drink. Furthermore, she alleged that she suffered gas-
troenteritis as a result of having drunk some of the ginger beerH. 
The House of Lords, by a majority of three 111 to two16, 
torts professors of the day, ... [who] had to tear up the old notes they had been reading 
from in their torts lectures for years," Linden, supra note 2, 67, at 67, but also by some 
newspapers. THE SCOTSMAN, 27 May 1932, considers Donoghue v. Stevenson as being a 
"novel point" which "should be welcomed by the public." The (1933) 3 FORTHNIGHTLY 
L.J. 24, speaks of "one of the most important decisions of the century." For the press 
reaction, see also Linden, supra note 2, 67, at 67-69. 
9. Donoghue v. Stevenson has been treated in several papers; see, e.g., DONOGHUE v. 
STEVENSON AND THE MODERN LAW OF NEGLIGENCE - THE PAISLEY PAPERS (Peter Burns ed. 
1991); Franco Ferrari, Produkthaftung und Negligence: Sechzig Jahre Donoghue v. Ste-
venson, ZEITSCHRIFT FOR EUROPAISCHES PRIVATRECHT 354 (1993); R. F. V. Heuston, Dono-
ghue v. Stevenson In Retrospect, 20 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1957); Florence O'Donoghue, A 
half-century of neighborliness: Donoghue v. Stevenson reconsidered, LAW & JUSTICE 4 
(1984); Alan Rodger, Lord MacMillan's Speech in Donoghue v. Stevenson, 108 L.Q.R. 
236 (1992); Reinhard Zimmermann, " ... his soul goes sliding on forever, ZEITSCHRIFT 
FOR EUROPAISCHES PRIVATRECHT 435 (1993). 
10. Even though the decision under review is best known as Donoghue v. Stevenson, 
there has been some uncertainty about how to quote it. In fact, while in (1932) A.C. 562 
it is referred to as M'Alister (or Donoghue) (Pauper) v. Stevenson, the ALL ENGLAND 
REPORT, (1987) 2 All E.R. 14, refers to it as Mrs. Donoghue (or M'Alister). For a more 
detailed examination of this problem, see Rodger, supra note 3. 
11. In fact, in Donoghue v. Stevenson the House of Lords did not have to decide 
whether Mrs. Donoghue should be awarded the sum of money she claimed in damages, 
as was erroneously stated in the DAILY HERALD, 27 May 1932. "This mistake can proba-
bly be explained by the fact that in her pleadings [Mrs. Donoghue] had claimed pound 
500 in damages, which the journalist wrongly assumed she had been granted", Linden, 
supra note 2, 67, at 68. 
12. As' for information on Mrs. Donoghue, as well as for information on the other 
persons involved in Donoghue v. Stevenson, see Rodger, supra note 3. Further informa-
tion on "the woman whose alleged misfortune was to transform the Common Law", Rod-
ger, supra note 3, 1, at 3, can be found in some columns in THE SUNDAY TIMES COLOUR 
MAGAZINE, 8 February 1976, p. 30, which "[u]nfortunately ... contain elements of sheer 
fantasy so that Mrs. Donoghue's life becomes a Gothic Romance." Id. 
13. Linden, supra note 2, 67, at 68. 
14. See Donoghue v. Stevenson, (1932) A.C. 562, 563. 
15. Lord Atkin, Lord MacMillan and Lord Thankerton were the judges in the 
majority. 
16. The two Law Lords who dissented were Lord Buckmaster and Lord Tomlin, 
2
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stated, in spite of a contrary decision in a similar case17, that 
"Mrs. Donoghue's pleadings were 'relevant', that is, that they 
disclosed a cause of action. "18 
II. DONOGHUE v. STEVENSON: ITS INFLUENCE ON 
PRODUCT LIABILITY 
This decision, which some authors consider as being linked 
to the industrial revolution,19 influenced, as mentioned supra, 
not only product liability law, but the law of torts as well. Up 
until the beginning of the 20th century, English product liability 
law was based upon the same principles as the law of tort, i.e., 
holding the manufacturer liable required not only the proof of 
his carelessness, but also proof of a "breach of a particular duty 
of care owed ... to the victim. "20. And it was this specific duty 
who later were decribed as "timorous souls", Per Lord Denning in R. H. Candler v. 
Crane, Christmas & Co., (1951) 2 K.B. 164, at 178 (C.A.), and who were accused of being 
timid and "less courageous", Pollock, supra note 4, 22, at 22. 
The differences between the majority and the dissenters has been described as an 
example of "[the] working of two antagonistic schools of interpretation; namely, the con-
servative and legalistic, the liberal and sociological," Vincent MacDonald, Torts - The 
Liability of Manufacturer to the Ultimate Consumer, 10 CAN. B. REV. 478, at 478, 
quoted according to Linden, supra note 2, 67, at 80. 
17. See Mullen v. Barr & Company, (1929) S.C. 461, in regard to which Linden, 
supra note 2, 67, at 72, stated that "Lord Moncrieff ... felt that he was not bound by 
Mullen v. Burr & Company, a case with almost identical facts involving a mouse, on the 
basis that it had proceeded upon the footing that negligence had not been proved ... 
[However,] Mr. Stevenson appealed Lord Moncrieff's decision to the Second division of 
the Court of Sessions, where the Lord Justice Clerk (Lord Alness), Lord Ormidale and 
Lord Anderson held that they were bound by their previous decision in Mullen v. Barr & 
Company, holding that no cause of action was disclosed." 
18. [d. 
19. It has often been argued that both the English and the American law of negli-
gence were linked to the industrial revolution, but this thesis does not seem to be tena-
ble. Indeed, as far as the American tort of negligence is concerned, one must note that its 
leading case, Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850) "did not involve industry, but was 
instead a case growing out of the actions of private persons engaged in separating two 
fighting dogs," Peck, Negligence and Liability without Fault in Tort Law, quoted ac-
cording to JAMES HENDERSON & RICHARD PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 322 (3rd ed. 
1988). And as far as the English law of negligence is concerned, one must note that 
Donoghue v. Stevenson occurred after the industrial revolution, i.e., when there was no 
necessity to believe "that the development ... under a system of private enterprise 
would be hindered and delayed as long as the element of chance exposed the enterprisers 
to liability for the consequences of pure accident, without fault of some kind," Charles 
Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359, at 365 (1951). 
For a critic see also Franco Ferrari, Comparative Ruminations on Liability for One's 
Own Acts, 15 LOYOLA OF LA INT'L & COMPo L. J 813, 827 et seq. 
20. See, e.g., 2 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
3
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of care which, up to the beginning of the 20th century, pre-
vented the possibile application of the law of torts to the manu-
facturer, "since it was thought that whereas a person who manu-
factured - or repaired goods of any kind - was under a duty of 
care towards his purchaser or customer, he owed no such duty to 
any third party with whom he had no contract."21 Consequently, 
the consumer could claim damages on neither a contractual nor 
a tortious basis,22 even if he could prove the carelessness of the 
manufacturer, since the latter did not owe a duty of care to the 
consumer.23 As far as product liability is concerned, Donoghue v. 
Stevenson's importance consisted in rejecting this "fallacy",24 a 
tendency which had been initiated in America by MacPherson v. 
Buick Motor CO.2r. and in Canada by Buckely v. Mott. 26 Indeed, 
Donoghue v. Stevenson laid down the principle according to 
which "manufacturers did owe a duty of care to the ultimate 
consumer not to create risks of harm through the manufacturing 
process. "27 
306 (2d ed. 1987). 
21. Id. 
22. As far as this principle is concerned, Joseph C. Smith, Economic Loss and the 
Common Law Marriage of Contracts and Torts, 18 U.B.C. L. REv. 95, at 96 (1984), 
pointed out that "this line of cases seems to stem from a misapplication of Winterbot-
tom v. Wright, (1842) 10 M. & W. 109, 152 E.R. 402 (Ex.). For a similar statement, see 
also, Linden, supra note 2, 67, at 85. 
23. The relationship between carelessness (negligent conduct) and duty of care has 
been emphasized very clearly by Lord Esher in LeLievre v. Gould, (1893) 1 Q.B. 491, 
497, quoted according to ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 20, at 306: "A man is entitled to 
be as negligent as he pleases towards the whole world if he owes no duty to them." 
24. This expression has been used for example by Harold Evans, A certain lawyer 
stood up -Donoghue v. Stevenson 50 years on, NEW ZEALAND L.J. 159, at 159 (1982), 
where the author proclaims that "Donoghue's Case produced ... also the rejection of the 
fallacy that, because there was no contractual liability on the manufacturer's part to the 
plaintiff, therefore there could be no liability in tort." 
25. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). It has 
been said that on the basis of this decision, "there was a gradual relaxation of the severe 
rule that even the proven carelessness of a manufacturer did not expose him to any tort 
liability towards third parties who had no contract with him," ZWEIGERT & KOTz, supra 
note 20, at 306. 
26. See Buckley v. Matt, (1920) 50 D.L.R. 408 (N.S.S.C.), in regard to which Linden, 
supra note 2, 67, 83, proclaimed that "[it) is ironic indeed that, despite the undoubted 
significance of Donoghue v. Stevenson on the development of the Canadian negligence 
law dealing with products, a judge in Nova Scotia came actually to the same conclusion 
12 years earlier in Buckley v. Mott." And it is only "[b)ecause of the absence of penetrat-
ing analysis and the modesty of prose [that] Buckley v. Matt has been largely ignored," 
Linden, supra note 2, 67, at 84. 
27. Smith, supra note 22, 95, at 96. According to ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 20, 
at 306, Donoghue v. Stevenson laid down the principle that "the manufacturer owes the 
consumer a duty of care at least when, through the intermediary of a dealer, he delivers 
4
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However, since Donoghue v. Stevenson, product liability 
has changed: most legal systems belonging to the common law 
area have substituted strict liability for fault liability.28 And 
even though the importance of this decision "is likely to be re-
duced and eventually eclipsed. . . that does not mean that we 
shall forget Donoghue v. Stevenson",29 above all if one considers 
"[its lasting] impact on the general principles of the law of negli-
gence and on tort law theory generally. "SO 
III. DONOGHUE v. STEVENSON AND THE LAW OF 
TORTS 
The contribution of the "McAllister's Case"Sl to the law of 
torts is even more important and lasting than its contribution to 
product liability, even though on Donoghue v. Stevenson's 25th 
anniversary Professor Heuston predicted that on its 50th anni-
versary in 1982 the "Snail Case" would be of little more than 
antiquarian interestS2. He was wrong. Donoghue v. Stevenson's 
influence will last forever, since "[it] revolutionized the law of 
negligence"Ss, by attributing to the concept of "negligence", in 
the sense of an independent type of tort,s. a new meaning. This 
to the consumer goods whose freedom from defect neither the dealer nor the consumer 
was in any position to ascertain." 
28. See, for a similar affirmation, e.g., Linden, supra note 2, 67, at 85, quoted supra 
note. See also, ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 20, at 307. 
29. Linden, supra note 2, 67, at 86. 
30.Id. 
31. This appellation is used in 174 Law Times 399 (1932). 
32. See Heuston, supra note 19, 1, at 1. Professor Heuston was convinced Donoghue 
v. Stevenson would soon become a mere "repository of ancient learning", Id., "because 
he thought that tort law would likely be abolished and replaced by a social insurance 
scheme by that time", Linden, supra note 2, 67, at 67. 
33. Rina Harber, Snails, snails and more snails, 66 LAW INSTITUTE J. 201, at 201 
(1992) (reviewing DONOGHUE V. STEVENSON AND THE MODERN LAW OF NEGLIGENCE - THE 
PAISLEY PAPERS (PETER BURNS ed. 1991». 
34. As it is known, "negligence is both a way of committing various torts and a tort 
on its own," GLANVILLE WILLIAMS & B. A. HEPPLE, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORT 88 
(1976). See also, WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT 25 (W. V. H. Rogers ed. 1975), where 
it is stated that negligence not only constitutes an element of fault, "it also has the 
further meaning of an independent tort, with the specific name of 'negligence'." A simi-
lar distincion has also been made earlier by Winfield, The History of the Law of Torts, 
42 L.Q.R. 184, at 196 (1926): "Negligence in the law of torts has a double meaning; it 
may signify a) a definite tort (the tort of negligence) ... b) a possible mental element in 
the commission of some other (but by no means all) torts." 
However, more recently CHARLESWORTH, ON NEGLIGENCE 1 (1971), argued that "in 
current forensic speech negligence has three meanings. They are 1) a state of mind ... , 
5
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meaning bears some similarity to a general clause known in 
some civil law systems,35 at least as far as torts based upon neg-
ligent conduct are concerned. 
Before the decision of the House of Lords under review, the 
English tort of negligence and its procedure was characterized, 
not unlike the law of the nominate torts, by "[that] it was first 
asked whether the causing of the harm fell within one of the 
existing categories of torts. "36 If there was no "breach of a le-
gally recognized duty of care",37 the plaintiff would not re-
cover,38 i.e., "prior to 1932, negligent conduct only could give 
rise to liability in limited, specific circumstances."39 
As has often been pointed out, the importance of Donoghue 
v. Stevenson consisted in widening40 the scope of application of 
2) careless conduct, and 3) the breach of a duty to take care ... " 
35. For a similar evaluation of the tort of negligence after Donoghue v. Stevenson, 
see also some Italian writers, as Paolo Gallo, Tipicita ed atipicita dell'illecito in common 
law, in ATLANTE DI DIRITTO PRIVATO COMPARATO 145, at 153 (Francesco Galgano & Franco 
Ferrari eds., 1992); Antonello Miranda, The Negligence Saga: lrragionevolezza edingiu-
stizia del danno nel risarcimento delle pure economic losses, Rlv. DIR. CIV. 387, at 403 
(1992). In English literature, see above all, Joseph C. Smith & Peter Burns, Donoghue v. 
Stevenson - The not so Golden Anniversary, 46 MOD. L. REV. 147, 149 (1983), where the 
authors use the expression "general principle". 
However, even though there may be some similarities between the English tort of 
negligence and the unintentional torts of some civil law systems based upon a general 
clause, they are not comparable since the scope of application of the latter is broader. 
The possible danger of comparing the common law's tort of negligence with the civil 
law's unintentional tort has been recognized by several authors. See, e.g., ANDRt TUNC, 
INTRODUCTION, in 11(1) INT. ENC. COMPo L. 54 (1974), where the author states that "at 
first sight, we may be tempted to say that the tort of negligence comes extremely close to 
the concept of faute as elaborated in the French-based legal systems, and by French CC 
art. 1382 in particular." 
36. Smith & Burns, supra note 35, 147, at 149. 
37. Smith & Burns, supra note 35, 147, at 150. 
38. For an example of the application of the aforementioned principle, see, e.g., 
Simpson v. Thomson, (1877) A.C. 279, 290: "[TJhe ground upon which I will ask your 
Lordships to reject this contention of the Respondent's counsel is this-that upon the 
cases citied no precedent or authority has been found or produced to the House for an 
action against the wrongdoer." For this problem, see also, Paolo Gallo, II Tort of Negli-
gence: Dalla responsabilita per ipotesi tipiche alia regola del neminem laedere, RESP. 
CIV. PREVo 15, at 23 (1986). 
39. Joycey Tooher, Still Silvery on its Diamond Jubilee?, On the Trial of that elu-
sive snail (Donoghue v. Stevenson), 66 LAW INSTITUTE J. 378, at 379 (1992). 
40. Of course, while the supporters of Donoghue v. Stevenson insist on its impor-
tance for having widened the area of the tort of negligence, the opponents criticize this 
element. See, e.g., Heuston, supra note 19, 1, at 23, where the author proclaims that 
Donoghue V. Stevenson "has been overemphasised by both its supporters and its oppo-
nents. It was not intended to be, and cannot properly be treated as being, a general 
6
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the principles of the tort of negligence,"} i.e., in freeing the possi-
bility 'to prove one's case' from its dependence on a precedent. 
After 1932, this should be looked upon as an example of the 
scope of application of the tort of negligence.42 In extremis, this 
results in a general principle"3 according to which "the categories 
of negligence are never closed."44 Consequently, nowadays the 
starting point in a tort of negligence case is no longer consti-
tuted by precedents, but by Donoghue v. Stevenson."f> Lord Reid 
pointed this out very clearly, when he stated that "[Donoghue v. 
Stevenson] ought to apply unless there is some justification or 
valid explanation for its exclusion.""6 
formula which will explain all conceivable cases of negligence ... It is indeed a sign of 
poverty of thought about the law of torts in this country that the proposition should 
have been called upon to bear a weight so manifestly greater than it could support." 
Other legal writers tried to "curb the generality of Lord Atkin's wider principle, [too]," 
W. E. P. DeRoche, Torts - Negligence - Duty of Care - Liability of Contractor to Third 
Person, 13 CAN. B. REV. 112, at 114 (1935). See, e.g., SALMOND ON THE LAW OF TORTS 546-
547 (8th ed. 1934), where the author suggests to confine the "Snail Case" only to food 
and drink manufacturers. However, as has been pointed out by Linden, supra note 2, 67, 
at 81-82, "[t]he prize for the narrowest view of Donoghue v. Stevenson . .. goes to the 
Solicitors Journal which, in apparent seriousness, suggested that 'There might be a dis-
tinction between draft and bottled beer, the former falling without and the latter within 
the present case.' " 
41. See, e.g., WILLIAMS & HEPPLE, supra note 34, at 90, where the authors proclaim 
that "[the decision's most innovative element] was its insistence upon the expansible 
nature of the action of negligence." 
42. In this sense, see Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson, (1932) A.C. 562,: "I 
content myself with pointing out that in English law there must be, and is, some general 
conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of which the particular cases in the 
books are but instances." 
43. See, Smith & Burns, supra note 3, 93, at 99, where it is stated that the rules laid 
down in Donoghue v. Stevenson "can be the source of a general principle for all negli-
gent causing of harm," (italics added). 
44. Per Lord MacMillan in Donoghue v. Stevenson, (1932) A.C. 562, 619. 
45. For a similar affirmation, see, e.g., Smith & Burns, supra note 35, 147, 150: 
"Over the ensuing years the courts have gradually shifted their approach from that of 
ascertaining a specific duty of care for each kind of situation or class of relationships, to 
that of starting from the position of the general duty of care as enunciated in Donoghue 
v. Stevenson." 
46. Per Lord Reid in Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., (1970) A.C. 1004, 2027 
(H.L.), where Lord Reid also stated that "[a]bout the beginning of this century most 
eminent lawyers thought that there were a number of separate torts involving negligence, 
each with its own rules, and they were most unwilling to add more ... In later years 
there has been a steady trend towards regarding the law of negligence as depending on 
principle so that, when a new point emerges, one should ask not whether it is covered by 
authority but whether recognised principles apply to it. Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] 
A.C. 5621 may be regarded as a milestone, and the well-known passage in Lord Atkin's 
speech should I think be regarded as a statement of principle." 
7
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However, since "acts or omissions which any moral code 
would censure cannot in a practical world be treated so as to 
give a right to every person injured by them to demand relief,"47 
the general principle of Dononghue v. Stevenson, which brought 
English law into line with the American law,48 must be restricted 
by a rule "which limit[s] the range of complaints and the extents 
of their remedy."49 This rule, which is based upon Professor Pol-
lock's teachings, is known as the "neighbour principle"GO accord-
ing to which "[one] must take reasonable care to avoid acts or . 
omissions which ... can ... injure ... persons who are so closely 
and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have 
them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing 
my mind to the acts or ommissions which are called in 
question. "Gl 
And it is this principle, by the means of which "one of the 
basic teachings of Christianity - that you should love your neigh-
bour - [has been transformed] into the central principle of negli-
gence law,"G2 from which the decision under review derives its 
47. Per Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson, (1932) A.C. 562,580. 
48. See, for this affirmation, Pollock, supra note 4, 22, at 22, where the author not 
only defines Donoghue v. Stevenson as a "notable step", but also praises it "[for bringing 
English law] into the line with the prevailing opinion ... of our American learned 
friends." In fact, Donoghue v. Stevenson brought English law into line not only with the 
American product liability law at that time based upon MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 
supra note 25, but also with the American leading case of the law of negligence, Brown v. 
Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850). This "reunification" was necessary, because "in 1850 .. 
. the two systems (England and America) split asunder Chief Justice Shaw's leading opin-
ion in Brown v. Kendall," E. F. Roberts, Negligence: Blackstone to Shaw to? An Intel-
lectual Escapade in a Tory Vein, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 191, at 201 (1965). 
49. Per Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson, (1932) A.C. 562, 580. 
50. In 1889, FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 12 (1889), stated the principle 
according to which "Thou shalt do no hurt to thy neighbour. Our law of torts, with all its 
irregularities, has for its main purpose nothing else than the development of this pre-
cept." Au fond, this means to affirmatively answer the question whether the English 
"law of torts consist[s] of a fundamental general principle that it is wrongful to cause 
harm to other persons in the absence of some specific ground of justification or excuse", 
JOHN SALMOND, LAW OF TORTS 8-9 (1910), i.e., it means to reject the opinion according to 
which the law of torts "consist[s] of a number of specific rules prohibiting certain kinds 
of harmful activity, and leaving all the residue outside the sphere of legal responsibility," 
Id. 
51. Per Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson, (1932) A.C. 562, 580. 
52. Linden, supra note 2, 67, at 86. For a very similar statement which, however, 
contains some criticism, see Smith & Burns, supra note 35, 147, at 148. where it is stated 
that "[w]hile some of the recent developments in the law of negligence are, in general, 
encouraging, the final formulation of the "neighbour principle" alters the grounds of le-
gal liability by transforming the Christian precept ·of loving one's neighbour into a legal 
8
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"immortality".53 And this immortality will last, although Dono-
ghue v. Stevenson has been criticized both by legal scholars 54 
and judges,1i1i since "[the] neighbour principle play[s] an impor-
tant part in humanizing humanity."1i6 Furthermore, Donoghue v. 
Stevenson will survive, since it "can and does provide a magnifi-
cent vehicle to enable us to discuss what is acceptable and 
proper conduct and what is unacceptable and improper conduct 
... and so let us salute [and pay tribute to] Donoghue v. Ste-
venson on its [60th] anniversary . . . for helping to continue 
breathing new life in the law of torts."1i7 
responsibility for one's fellow man. Thus the separation between law and morality, which 
is essential for the autonomy of law as a social institution, is being seriously eroded in 
this area." 
53. See Linden, supra note 2, 67, at 86: "[It is] the 'neighbour principle', which is 
the greatest glory of Donoghue v. Stevenson and gives it immortality." 
54. Apart from Heuston, supra note 19, Donoghue v. Stevenson has been criticized 
by Smith & Burns, supra note 35, 147, 148, where the authors stated that "the poverty 
of thought about the law of torts, which Professor Heuston decried 25 years ago, is even 
more evident today." For a criticism, see also, BAKER, TORT 63 (1972); BELL, POLICY 
ARGUMENTS IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS 41 (1983); DIAS & BASIL S. MARKESINIS, THE ENGLISH 
LAW OF TORTS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 30 (1976); JAMES, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH 
LAW 262 (1976). For further information, see the literature listed in Gallo, supra note 38, 
15, at 21 note 32. 
55. Some judges avoid applying the "neighbour principle" laid down in Donoghue v. 
Stevenson by considering it, such as in Farr v. Butters Brothers and Company, (1932) 2 
K.B. 606, a mere obiter dictum instead of a ratio decidendi. As for this method of oppo-
sition to Donoghue v. Stevenson, see, e.g., STREET, ON TORTS 107 (6th ed. 1976): "If the 
court wishes to deny a duty it will usually hold that it is not bound by the dictum of 
Lord Atkin or else ignore it altogether . . . If the court views the plaintiff's pleadings 
favourably it may accept the dictum of Lord Atkin as binding and apply it directly." A 
similar statement can also be found in POLLOCK'S TORTS 329 (LANDON ed. 1951): " ... 
wherever the Court wishes to find for the Plaintiff, that doctrine will be invoked, just as 
it will be disregarded where the defendant is the favoured party." 
56. Linden, supra note 2, 67, 89. 
57. [d., at 89-90. 
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